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919 
SEARCHING INQUIRY REQUIREMENT IN CIVIL 
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS OF SEX OFFENDERS 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                              
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
In re New York v. Raul L.1 
(decided June 4, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondent2 Raul L. represented himself in a civil commit-
ment proceeding under the Sex Offenders Management and Treat-
ment Act (“SOMTA”).3  The court found him to be a dangerous sex 
offender requiring confinement4 and directed the respondent to a se-
 
1 988 N.Y.S.2d 190 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014). 
2 Because the civil commitment proceedings are civil in nature, the parties subject to civil 
commitment are designated as respondents.  See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(n) 
(McKinney 2011).  Defining respondent as: 
[A] person referred to a case review team for evaluation, a person as to 
whom a sex offender civil management petition has been recommended 
by a case review team and not yet filed, or filed by the attorney general 
and not dismissed, or sustained by procedures under this article. 
Id. § 10.03(n) 
3 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193; see generally Sara E. Chase, Note, The Sex Offender 
Management and Treatment Act: New York’s Attempt at Keeping Sex Offenders Off the 
Streets . . . Will it Work?, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 277 (2009) (providing the reasons behind the 
enactment of the Sex Offenders Management and Treatment Act and how the Act can be 
improved). 
4 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(b) (McKinney 2007).  The statute explains who 
requires confinement as a sex offender: 
That some sex offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them 
to engage in repeated sex offenses.  These offenders may require long-
term specialized treatment modalities to address their risk to reoffend.  
They should receive such treatment while they are incarcerated as a re-
sult of the criminal process, and should continue to receive treatment 
when that incarceration comes to an end.  In extreme cases, confinement 
of the most dangerous offenders will need to be extended by civil pro-
cess in order to provide them such treatment and to protect the public 
from their recidivistic conduct. 
1
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cure treatment facility.5  Respondent then appealed the trial court’s 
decision.6  He argued that he was deprived of his statutory right to 
counsel when the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry to 
make certain “that he was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of 
proceeding pro se.”7  The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department reversed the trial court’s decision in which 
the court found the respondent to be a dangerous sex offender requir-
ing confinement.8  The Appellate Division held that the lower court 
erred in granting the respondent’s request to proceed pro se9 without 
conducting a searching inquiry.10  Therefore, the court stated that the 
respondent’s waiver of his statutory right to counsel was ineffec-
tive.11 
This Case Note will discuss whether the court in Raul correct-
ly applied the searching inquiry standard, which is conducted by the 
courts in a criminal context, to a SOMTA proceeding pursuant to 
Mental Hygiene Law Article 10.12  In doing so, this Note will analyze 
the Appellate Division’s justifications for applying the searching in-
quiry standard to the SOMTA proceeding in Raul.13  Moreover, this 
Note will suggest how the court could have reached a better decision 
by appointing a standby counsel to be present during the SOMTA 
proceeding.  
Part II of this Note will describe the facts and procedural 
background of Raul, and the Appellate Division’s stance on the issue 
of the standard of waiver of the right to counsel in civil commitment 
proceedings.  Then Part III will discuss how the court analyzed the 
issue in Raul.  Part IV will address the federal approach to the issue 
presented in Raul.  In Part V, the approach taken by the State of New 
 
Id. §10.01(b). 
5 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 195; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(o) (McKinney 2011) 
(defining secure treatment facility as “a facility located on the grounds of a correctional fa-
cility, that is staffed with personnel from the office of mental health or the office for people 
with developmental disabilities for the purposes of providing care and treatment to persons 
confined”). 
6 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 195. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 200. 
9 A person proceeding pro se “represents oneself in a court proceeding without the assis-
tance of a lawyer.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (8th ed. 2004).  
10 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 200. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 192. 
13 Id. at 197-99. 
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Jersey on the issue will be presented.  In Part VI, the holding in Raul 
will be discussed.  Finally, Part VII will provide recommendations on 
how the court could have reached a better decision. 
II. IN RE NEW YORK V. RAUL L. 
A. Factual Background and Procedural History 
In 2003, Raul L., at the age of 15, “entered a woman’s home, 
struck her in the head with a baseball bat,” and sexually assaulted her 
while she was unconscious.14  In 2005, a jury convicted him of sod-
omy in the first degree and assault in the first and second degree.  He 
was sentenced to prison.15 
In March 2011, the State of New York commenced SOMTA 
proceedings, (“trial”) pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, to 
determine whether probable cause existed to believe that the appel-
lant was a sex offender requiring civil management.16  The respond-
ent was detained at a secure treatment facility pending trial.17  Before 
the trial, the respondent’s counsel recommended to the respondent 
that the proceedings be adjourned.18  The respondent disagreed with 
the recommendation.19  Prompted by this disagreement, the respond-
ent’s counsel moved for leave to withdraw from the case.20  The trial 
court denied counsel’s application and granted the adjournment of the 
proceedings.21 
During the trial, the court explained to the respondent that if 
new counsel were appointed, the new counsel would require a few 
 
14 Id. 
15 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193. 
16 Id.; see N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03(q) (McKinney 2011) (defining a sex offender 
requiring civil management as “a detained sex offender who suffers from a mental abnormal-
ity.  A sex offender requiring civil management can, as determined by procedures set forth in 
this article, be either (1) a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement or (2) a sex offend-
er requiring strict and intensive supervision.”). 
17 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (noting that after the trial court concluded that probable 
cause existed to believe that the respondent was a sex offender requiring civil management, 
the trial court directed that the respondent be detained at a secure treatment facility). 
18 Id.  From the facts of the case it is not clear why the respondent’s counsel wanted the 
proceedings to be adjourned. 
19 Id. (noting that the respondent opposed his counsel’s recommendation on “an adjourn-
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more months to prepare.22  The respondent then stated that he would 
like to “fight” his own case and was willing to proceed pro se.23  He 
also informed the court about his familiarity with the Diagnostics and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (“DSM—IV”).24  The court 
then relieved his counsel.25 
The Assistant Attorney General, representing the State, 
showed his concern about the trial court’s failure to conduct a broad-
er inquiry concerning the respondent’s ability to represent himself 
and handle the case.26  In response to his concern, the court stated that 
it was only obligated to “put on the record” that the respondent was 
aware “that he would represent himself” and did not need an attor-
ney.27  Further, the court, referring to the letter written by the re-
spondent regarding his disagreement, found that the letter demon-
strated that the respondent knew how to read and write.28 
B. The Appellate Division’s Decision 
On appeal, the Appellate Division had to decide whether the 
respondent was deprived of his statutory right to counsel when the 
trial court granted his request to proceed pro se without conducting a 
searching inquiry.29  The court held that a trial court must conduct a 
searching inquiry in SOMTA proceedings to determine whether a re-
spondent intelligently and voluntarily waived his statutory right to 
counsel.30  Therefore, the trial court’s error of granting the respond-
 
22 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193. 
23 Id. 
24 Id.; see DSM, AMN. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2015) (explaining that the “Diagnostics and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM) is the standard classification of mental disorders used by mental health 
professionals in the United States”). 
25 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 193. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 193-94.  When the Assistant Attorney General insisted again that “a further in-
quiry was necessary, the court replied that it was satisfied that the appellant was aware of 
what he was doing.” 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 195.  One of the issues on appeal was “that the State failed to establish, by clear 
and convincing evidence that [the respondent] was a sex offender suffering from a mental 
abnormality.”  This Note, however, will not focus on that issue. 
30 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 200 (noting that “a court must conduct a searching inquiry in 
order to determine whether a respondent in a SOMTA intelligently and voluntarily waived 
the statutory right to counsel is manifest, considering that such proceedings invariably re-
quire expert testimony and two separate hearings”). 
4
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ent’s request to proceed pro se without conducting a searching in-
quiry deprived the respondent of his statutory right to counsel.31 
III. ANALYSIS 
In order to decide the issue, the court in Raul had to determine 
“whether the due process considerations that underpin a sex offend-
er’s statutory right to counsel in a SOMTA proceeding obligate the 
court to conduct the same type of searching inquiry that is required in 
a criminal proceeding.”32  In reaching its decision, the court applied a 
very systematic approach.  The court first examined the kind of 
searching inquiry conducted in criminal cases and then analyzed 
whether SOMTA proceedings were criminal or civil in nature.  After 
concluding that SOMTA proceedings were civil in nature, the court 
had to determine whether the due process concerns that are implicat-
ed in a criminal case require the same searching inquiry be conducted 
in a SOMTA proceeding.  To better understand how the court in Raul 
reached its decision, this Case Note will discuss each question that 
the court answered in reaching its decision. 
A. The Searching Inquiry in Criminal Cases 
After the court in Raul ascertained that “the federal and state 
constitutional right to counsel also includes” the right of self-
representation and the right to refuse appointed counsel,33 it looked at 
various criminal cases to analyze what type of searching inquiry is 
conducted in criminal cases and the scope of such inquiry.34 
1.  People v. Smith 
In 1998, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Smith35 
reviewed whether the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was 
effective.36  The defendant in Smith was convicted of selling illegal 
drugs.37  Numerous times, before and during the trial, the defendant 
 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 197. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 197-98. 
35 705 N.E.2d 1205 (N.Y. 1998). 
36 Id. at 1206. 
37 Id. 
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expressed his unhappiness with his assigned attorney and frequently 
requested that the court assign new counsel.38  The defendant also 
maintained that he could not proceed pro se.39  The court repeatedly 
denied his request for new counsel.40  During the trial, the defend-
ant’s counsel requested to be relieved because the defendant had 
threatened him.41  The trial judge discussed this allegation with the 
defendant.42  During the “waiver-textured colloquy,” the defendant 
never asserted that he wanted to proceed pro se, but the judge re-
lieved his counsel.43  For the rest of the trial, the defendant proceeded 
pro se and was found guilty.44 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s deci-




40 Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1206. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 1206-07.  Following is the discussion between the defendant and the judge: 
THE COURT: I told you, Mr. Smith, that that's the only legal counsel you're 
going to get.  Now, you have no right—and I have no reason to disbelieve Mr. 
Kury, as an officer of the Court, if he told me you said something.  So it looks 
like you don't want Mr. Kury.  So I'm going to let you proceed without Mr. 
Kury as your attorney.  He will sit back there and if you want to ask him a 
question, he will give you legal advice.  If you think you know how to con-
duct a cross-examination, you can do it, but you're not going to abuse attor-
neys. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm not going to abuse attorneys, but it's all right for an 
attorney to abuse me?  
THE COURT: In what manner are you claiming that he abused you? 
THE DEFENDANT: In what manner are you saying I abused him? 
THE COURT: If he tells me that you threatened him, as an officer of the 
Court, I believe him.  Are you telling me that he threatened you? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, but I didn't threaten him either.  I just told the man 
it's like there's two D.A.'s in here. 
THE COURT: I'm sure Mr. Kury will accept your apology if you want him to 
continue as your attorney. 
THE DEFENDANT: No, there's two D.A.'s in here. 
THE COURT: That's your opinion.  I don't see two D.A.'s in here. 
THE DEFENDANT: Not on paper, but other than that. 
THE COURT: And you don't want him?  You're discharging him? 
THE DEFENDANT: Now you're discharging him, I'm not discharging him. 
MR. KURY: Your Honor, I am— 
THE COURT: I'm relieving him.  He doesn't have to take this abuse, I'm re-
lieving him. 
Id. at 1207. 
44 Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1207. 
45 Id. at 1209. 
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fendant was inadequately warned by the trial court about the risks of 
proceeding pro se; therefore, his implied waiver of right to counsel 
was ineffective.46  The Court of Appeals noted that “a trial court must 
be satisfied that a defendant’s waiver is unequivocal, voluntary and 
intelligent” even if the defendant insists on proceeding pro se and re-
nounces the benefits that are associated with his right to counsel.47  
Further, the court held that if the searching inquiry is not conducted, 
then the waiver of the right to counsel will not be recognized as ef-
fective. 
Moreover, the court stated that to recognize whether or not 
such a requirement is appropriately satisfied, trial courts should con-
duct a searching inquiry into whether the defendant understands the 
dangers and risks associated with waiving his right to counsel and 
proceeding pro se.48  Furthermore, the trial courts are also required to 
investigate other factors (e.g., age, education, and occupation) that 
might bear on a defendant’s competency, intelligence, and voluntary 
waiver.49  The court even noted that “a defendant’s refusal to cooper-
ate with” his assigned counsel, or to acknowledge the assigned coun-
sel, cannot be considered a waiver of his right to counsel.50 
2.  People v. Arroyo 
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Arroyo51 ad-
dressed the issue of the inherent clash between a defendant’s right to 
self-representation and his right to counsel.52  The defendant in Ar-
royo was convicted of robbery and grand larceny after a jury trial.53  
During the trial, the defendant informed the trial court that he wanted 
 
46 Id. at 1208-09 (noting that the record shows that the trial judge at several points during 
his colloquy “made cautionary or encouraging statements to defendant about the fact that 
defendant had a right to an attorney,” and the trial judge also ensured that the defendant 
knew that he had an “excellent” assigned counsel.  However, the trial judge failed to address 
the “key admonition that is designed to pointedly alert a defendant of potential pro se repre-
sentation pit falls and responsibilities.”). 
47 Id. at 1207 (noting that “[g]overning principles demand that appropriate record explora-
tion between the trial court and defendant be conducted, both to test an accused's understand-
ing of the waiver and to provide a reliable basis for appellate review”). 
48 Id. 
49 Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208. 
50 Id. 
51 772 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 2002). 
52 Id. at 1155. 
53 Id. 
7
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to proceed pro se and expressed his dissatisfaction with his assigned 
counsel.54  The trial court made some “cursory warnings,” but the 
court was mainly concerned with whether the defendant was of 
“sound mind.”55  The trial court then granted the defendant’s request 
to proceed pro se.  However, the trial court requested the defense 
counsel to be present as stand-by counsel.56 
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Divi-
sion’s decision affirming the trial court’s decision, and held that the 
defendant was not allowed to represent himself because “the trial 
court failed to secure an effective waiver of counsel.”57  The court 
noted that a defendant proceeding pro se must make a voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel, and to evalu-
ate whether the waiver meets the requirements, the court should con-
duct a searching inquiry of the defendant.58  Moreover, the court stat-
ed that even though the defendant does not need to possess the 
experience and skills of an attorney, he should be told about the risks 
and disadvantages associated with self-representation so that he is 
aware of “what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”59 
B. Are SOMTA Proceedings Criminal in Nature? 
1. In Re New York v. Floyd Y. 
The New York Court of Appeals in In Re New York v. Floyd 
Y.60 had to decide whether the defendant’s due process rights were 
violated when the trial court allowed “experts to introduce unreliable, 
 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  Following is the discussion that was noted by the trial court: 
[Y]ou have a right to do it because I don’t think there’s anything wrong 
with you.  A person has a right to represent himself, but it is usually not 
a good idea. . . .  I don’t have to ask you any questions to know that you 
are sensible to some extent and have a right to represent yourself.  I have 
to make sure that you're of sound mind and the rest of it and I’m con-
vinced of that.  But I would like to talk you out of it because [defense 
counsel is] going to make a better summation. 
Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1155. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1156. 
58 Id. at 1155. 
59 Id. at 1156 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1974)). 
60 2 N.E.3d 204 (N.Y. 2013). 
8
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testimonial hearsay.”61  The Appellate Division held that the trial 
court did err in allowing the expert’s opinions because they were 
based on unreliable accusations against the defendant, but the Appel-
late Division did find this error to be harmless, which prompted the 
appeal to the Court of Appeals.62  The New York Court of Appeals, 
in reversing the decision of the Appellate Division, held that “[t]he 
admission of the unreliable hearsay was not harmless error” because 
two of the allegations in the opinion testimony violated the defend-
ant’s due process right.63  In order to determine whether the right to 
due process exists in a SOMTA proceeding, the court analyzed 
whether SOMTA proceedings were civil in nature rather than crimi-
nal. 
The court noted that “[w]hen a sex offender commitment stat-
ute is punitive in nature, the respondent enjoys the same due process 
rights as a criminal defendant.”64  However, the civil commitment 
proceeding is not criminal in nature “when the State acts through its 
parens patriae power to confine a sex offender for therapy and treat-
ment . . . .”65  Further, by interpreting the language in the statute the 
court found that SOMTA “falls squarely within the substantive due 
process requirements for civil process.” 66  Moreover, the court 
looked at other New York cases and recognized that SOMTA has a 
remedial purpose rather than a penal one.67  Therefore, the court 
found that the constitutional protection of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments do not apply in SOMTA proceedings, but due process 
rights still exist through the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.68 
2. In Re New York v. Campany 
In In Re New York v. Campany,69 the issue was whether, in a 
criminal action, the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 
 
61 Id. at 209. 
62 Id. at 208. 
63 Id. at 214-15. 
64 Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 209. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 210. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 209 (noting that the scope of procedural due process is governed by the balancing 
test as expressed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
69 905 N.Y.S.2d 419 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2010). 
9
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should be applied to SOMTA proceedings.70  The Appellate Division, 
Fourth department analyzed whether SOMTA proceedings are crimi-
nal or civil in nature, and the court held that the proceedings are of a 
civil nature.71  The court in Campany reasoned that even though the 
jury trial pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 has some char-
acteristics of a criminal trial (e.g., the jury consists of 12 jurors and a 
unanimous verdict must be rendered), the legislative intent, plain lan-
guage of the statute, and purpose of the statute make it civil, rather 
than criminal, in nature. 72 
C. Statutory Right to Counsel in SOMTA Proceedings 
Under SOMTA, a respondent has a statutory right to counsel 
when the court shall appoint the counsel for a respondent if the re-
spondent is financially unable to obtain counsel himself.73  The court 
in Raul examined a variety of family court proceedings in which, 
even though no Sixth Amendment right of counsel was involved, the 
court applied the same principles that are applied in criminal cases to 
safeguard the right to counsel.74 
In Matter of Kathleen K. (Steven K.),75 where the family court 
refused to allow the respondent’s father to proceed pro se in a pro-
ceeding to terminate his parental rights, the New York Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the ruling of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate 
 
70 Id. at 422. 
71 Id. at 423-25. 
72 Id. at 425. 
73 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(c)-(d) (McKinney 2012).  Stating when the court 
shall appoint an attorney for the respondent: 
(c) Promptly upon the filing of a sex offender civil management petition, 
or upon a request to the court by the attorney general for an order pursu-
ant to subdivision (d) of this section that a respondent submit to an eval-
uation by a psychiatric examiner, whichever occurs earlier, the court 
shall appoint counsel in any case where the respondent is financially un-
able to obtain counsel. 
(d) [T]he attorney general may request the court in which the sex offend-
er civil management petition could be filed, or is pending, to order the 
respondent to submit to an evaluation by a psychiatric examiner.  Upon 
such a request, the court shall order that the respondent submit to an 
evaluation by a psychiatric examiner chosen by the attorney general and, 
if the respondent is not represented by counsel, the court shall appoint 
counsel for the respondent. 
Id. 
74 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 198. 
75 953 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 2011). 
10
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Division, Second Department, because the record did not demonstrate 
that the respondent’s application for self-representation was unequiv-
ocal and timely.76  The court noted that such proceeding has a “Faret-
ta-type right of self-representation.”77  Further, the court mentioned 
that if the request to proceed pro se had been timely, then a searching 
inquiry would have been triggered to ensure that the respondent’s 
waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary.78 
Although family court proceedings are civil in nature, they 
implicate constitutional due process concerns because these proceed-
ings “involve issues of fundamental import relating to the welfare and 
custody of children.”79  Furthermore, these proceedings can also “re-
sult in adjudication that can bear an everlasting and significant stig-
ma.”80 
D. SOMTA Proceedings and Due Process Implications  
Although SOMTA proceedings are civil in nature and no con-
stitutional protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply, the 
respondent has a constitutional right to due process.81  Even though in 
a family court proceeding the rights at stake are significant, the court 
in Raul stated that the rights at risk in SOMTA proceedings are no 
less important than those in a family court proceeding.82  The court, 
in differentiating criminal trials from SOMTA proceedings, stated 
that the implications for one’s due process rights in SOMTA proceed-
ings are greater than those for the due process rights involved in a 
criminal trial because in a criminal trial, an individual has a definite 
sentence, while in SOMTA proceedings an individual can be indefi-
nitely and involuntarily detained for his lifetime.83  The threat to the 
 
76 Id. at 776-78. 
77 Id. at 777.  For a discussion of Faretta v. California, see infra Part IV. 
78 Id. 
79 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 198. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 200 (noting that “at the heart of the due process guarantees in the federal and state 
constitutions is the principle that when the State seeks to take life, liberty, or property from 
an individual, the State must provide effective procedures that guard against an erroneous 
deprivation”). 
82 Id. at 199. 
83 Id. at 199; see also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §10.09(h) (McKinney 2012) (noting that 
“[a]t the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, if the court finds by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the respondent is currently a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, the 
11
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liberty of a respondent is more severe.84  Therefore, the court in Raul 
reasoned that the standard for the waiver of the right to counsel in 
criminal proceedings is in every respect proper in SOMTA proceed-
ings because of the due process implications.85 
IV. FEDERAL APPROACH 
To better evaluate whether the court in Raul applied the cor-
rect standard, it is necessary to have an understanding of the federal 
approach to this issue.  In criminal cases, the defendant has a right to 
counsel.86  That right to counsel has been applied to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.87  In 
Faretta v. California,88 the court held that in criminal cases the de-
fendant has a constitutional right, under the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, to waive his or her constitutional right to 
counsel.89  Therefore, the court must inform the defendant of the dis-
advantages of self-representation and that he will be held to the same 
standard as others for knowing the rules and procedures of the 
court.90  If an accused proceeds pro se, he relinquishes many of the 
established benefits related with the right to counsel; therefore, in or-
der to proceed pro se, the respondent must knowingly and intelligent-
ly relinquish those benefits.91  The accused should be told about the 
dangers and disadvantages associated with self-representation to es-
 
court shall continue the respondent's confinement.”). 
84 Raul L., 988 N.Y.S.2d at 198 (providing that the “a respondent in a SOMTA proceeding 
arguably faces an even more severe threat to his or her liberty than that faced by a criminal 
defendant”). 
85 Id. at 199-200. 
86 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
87 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
providing that the accused shall enjoy the right to counsel in criminal cases applies to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment of the constitution). 
88 422 U.S. 806 (1975).  
89 Id. at 836. 
90 Id. at 835. 
91 Id. 
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tablish that he makes his choice to self-represent knowingly and intel-
ligently.92  The defendant in a criminal case is not required to have 
the experience and skills of a lawyer in order to self- represent.93  
This searching inquiry is to be conducted by the court before the de-
fendant can waive his right to counsel in a criminal proceeding be-
cause in such a proceeding the defendant’s right to life, liberty, or 
property is at stake. 
In July 2006, Congress enacted the Civil Commitment of a 
Sexually Dangerous Person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act.94  Although Congress has provided the right to coun-
sel in such civil commitment proceedings,95 the courts have also held 
that because the outcome of such proceedings can be negative, which 
can result in a “massive curtailment of liberty,” procedural due pro-
cess guarantees certain protections in civil commitment proceedings 
to respondents.96  Therefore, the analysis of the court in Raul was 
correct.  If the court can provide right to counsel because the due pro-
cess concerns in civil commitment proceedings are the same as those 
in criminal proceedings, then the court should also apply the same 
standard for the waiver of the right to counsel in civil commitment 
proceedings that is applied in criminal trials because of the due pro-
cess implications. 
Furthermore, because the individuals’ rights at risk can impli-
cate due process concerns, the courts in civil cases have also con-
ducted inquiries into whether or not individuals are knowingly and 
voluntarily relieving their right to counsel.  Similarly, the court in 
 
92 Id. 
93 Farretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
94 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006). 
95 Certain protections, by statute, have been provided by Congress.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§4247(d) (2006) (providing the defendant with representation by counsel, and “an opportuni-
ty to testify, to present evidence, to subpoena witnesses . . . , and to confront and cross-
examine witnesses who appear at the hearing”). 
96 Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-93 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 
509 (1972)); see also United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 842-43 (4th Cir. 1995), which 
states: 
[T]he constitutional rights to which a defendant in a criminal trial is enti-
tled do not adhere to a respondent in a commitment hearing.  Nonethe-
less, because an adverse result in a commitment hearing results in a sub-
stantial curtailing of the respondent’s liberty (whether the respondent is 
already a prisoner or not), . . . the Supreme Court has held that procedur-
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Raul correctly held that the searching inquiry standard is the standard 
for the waiver of the right to counsel because the respondents in civil 
commitment trials have a lot at stake. 
V. SIMILARITY BETWEEN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AND CIVIL 
COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 
When determining whether a respondent suffers from mental 
abnormality, New York’s civil commitment statute requires clear and 
convincing evidence,97
 
which is in accordance with the standard of 
proof established by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas.98  
However, many scholars have argued that the standard of proof 
should be beyond a reasonable doubt because of the difficulties that 
arise in civil commitment proceedings and procedural fairness.99  But 
many states have kept the clear and convincing standard as the stand-
ard of proof for civil commitment proceedings.100 
The goals of criminal proceedings are the same as the goals of 
civil commitment for sex offenders because in both the state wants to 
protect its citizens from harm that can be caused by dangerous crimi-
nals.  As the goals of criminal proceedings and civil commitments for 
sex offenders are the same, so are the liberty interests that are at 
 
97 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §10.07(d) (McKinney 2007) (noting that the court “shall 
determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the respondent is a detained sex of-
fender who suffers from a mental abnormality.”). 
98 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979) (establishing the clear and con-
vincing standard as the minimum standard of proof required in order to perform a civil 
commitment). 
99 See Alexander Tsesis, Due Process in Civil Commitments, 68 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 
253, 257 (2011).  Stating that: 
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is better suited to civil com-
mitment hearings because it is more exacting and less likely to lead to 
the erroneous deprivation of liberty.  Two difficulties arise in civil com-
mitment.  The first of these involves repeated empirical findings that 
show psychiatrists are no better at predicting dangerous behaviors than 
untrained people.  The second problem judges face in applying the Su-
preme Court standard in Comstock is the ambiguity of the very concept 
of mental illness. 
Id. 
100 Id. at 275-77 (describing the statutory scheme of many states on the burden of proof 
requirement in civil commitment cases after Addington v. Texas and stating that “[t]he over-
whelming majority of states do not use the highest standard of proof for involuntary institu-
tionalization hearings.  They instead rely on the Supreme Court’s holding in Addington, 
which only requires clear and convincing proof.”). 
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stake.101  An alleged criminal who is not properly defended may end 
up spending more time in jail than he should.  Similarly, an alleged 
sex offender might be wrongfully civilly committed.  Because an in-
dividual may be deprived of a liberty interest, due process concerns 
arise in civil commitment proceedings.102  To prevent the wrongful 
deprivation of liberty, due process requires a “rigorous standard of 
proof.”103  Similarly, if a court allows a respondent to proceed pro se 
without conducting a searching inquiry, the liberty interests of such a 
respondent are at stake and could result in severe deprivation of liber-
ty if that respondent is found guilty.  Thus, to protect the liberty in-
terest of respondents, the courts should apply the searching inquiry. 
VI. IN RE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF D.Y. 
Because of the recent enactment of the civil commitment stat-
utes for sex offenders,104 the courts are still developing the governing 
body of law.  Other than New York, only a few states have provided 
guidance on whether the searching inquiry should be conducted in a 
civil commitment proceeding for sex offenders.  Some states have 
chosen not to rule on the issue of whether the respondent has a right 
to counsel in a civil commitment proceeding.105  But others have 
adopted the searching inquiry with certain limitations or requirements 
attached to the right of self-representation. 
Only a month after Raul, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in 
In re Civil Commitment of D.Y.106 reversed the decision of the Appel-
late Division, which held that a  respondent in a Sexually Violent 
 
101 See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a) (McKinney 2007) (explaining that 
“[c]ivil and criminal processes have distinct but overlapping goals, and both should be part 
of an integrated approach . . . .”). 
102 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (stating that “civil commitment for 
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protec-
tion”). 
103 Tsesis, supra note 99, at 260.  See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 
(1976) (stating how due process obligates courts to determine the risks that state action will 
result in an erroneous deprivation of one’s rights). 
104 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §304-27.1 (West 2009); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(a) 
(McKinney 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §71.09.030 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§980.015 (West 2008). 
105 See Favors v. Jesson, No. A13-1579, 2014 WL 997055, at*4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 
2014) (refusing to give any proper ruling on whether the respondent had a right to self-
represent himself in a criminal trial because the respondent failed to cite any authority). 
106 95 A.3d 157 (N.J. 2014). 
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Predator Act (“SVPA”)107 civil commitment proceeding does not 
have the right to self-representation.108  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court found that a sex offender who is competent to stand trial has a 
constitutional right to self-representation with standby counsel.109  
The issue was whether the respondent had a right to proceed pro se in 
an involuntary civil commitment proceeding pursuant to the 
SVPA.110 
The respondent in D.Y. was convicted of various sex offenses, 
both in state and federal court; in October 1994, he pled guilty to two 
counts of the federal indictment, and in April 1995, he was sentenced 
to 137 months incarceration.111  When the respondent was near com-
pletion of his term of incarceration, which was on or about June 7, 
2008, the State petitioned for the respondent’s involuntary civil 
commitment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.28.112  At the final civil 
commitment hearing, which D.Y. did not attend, the assigned counsel 
advised the court that the respondent had refused to talk to him and 
that the respondent wished to proceed pro se.113  The trial court only 
allowed the respondent to “participate in his representation in con-
junction with” his counsel.114 
First, the court found the genesis of the right to self-
representation in the English common law and English legal tradi-
tion.115  Second, because a respondent’s decision to proceed pro se 
may weaken his position in the case, and can also hinder the proceed-
ings, the need for standby counsel exists in cases where the litigants 
want to proceed pro se.116  Then the court referred to criminal pro-
ceedings in which the defendants exercised their right to proceed pro 
se and the presence of standby counsel was a successful solution to 
 
107 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.24 (West 1999). 
108 D.Y., 95 A.3d at 160. 
109 Id. at 171. 
110 Id. at 160. 
111 Id. at 161-62. 
112 Id. at 162; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.28(c) (West 1999) (stating that “[t]he Attor-
ney General may initiate a court proceeding for involuntary commitment . . . of an inmate 
who is scheduled for release upon expiration of a maximum term of incarceration . . . .”). 
113 D.Y., 95 A.3d at 163. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 165; see also Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 557 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
“[t]he origins of the right to appear for oneself in civil proceedings derive from a number of 
sources, all deeply rooted in our history and culture”). 
116 D.Y., 95 A.3d at 167. 
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the challenges that might be caused during the trial.117  The standby 
counsel helps not only the respondent, but also the court by protect-
ing the integrity of the civil commitment proceeding when a respond-
ent is uncooperative with the court.118 
Finally, the court in D.Y., analyzed the plain language of 
SVPA and held that it “requires that there be one of two alternative 
forms of representation at SVPA commitment hearings: (1) full rep-
resentation of the [respondent] by counsel or (2) self-representation” 
with standby counsel present throughout the proceedings and availa-
ble to assist the respondent if needed.119  Further, the court held that 
the decision to waive the right to full representation by counsel 
should be unequivocally and clearly stated to the trial court.120  
Moreover, the trial court should ensure the waiver is made by the re-
spondent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.121  The court re-
solved the issue in D.Y. by statutory construction and did not reach 
the Sixth Amendment and due process issues.122 
VII. DISCUSSION OF RAUL IN CONTEXT OF CASES DISCUSSED 
The court in Raul applied a very systematic approach in 
reaching its decision.  First, it inquired about what kind of searching 
inquiry is conducted in criminal cases.  For that reason, it analyzed 
different criminal cases.  It determined that for a waiver of the right 
to counsel to be effective, the courts in criminal cases must make sure 
that the defendant had been adequately warned about the risks and 
disadvantages of proceeding pro se and about the benefits of the right 
to counsel.  The courts in criminal cases must consider whether the 
defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right 
to counsel. 
After the court in Raul analyzed and discussed the scope of 
the searching inquiry in order to waive the right to counsel in crimi-
 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 168 (stating that having a standby counsel “also serves to protect the integrity of 
the proceeding when a litigant is uncooperative with the court and to the opposing counsel, 
or refuses to proceed at all”); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (finding that “the trial 
judge may terminate self-representation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious 
and obstructionist misconduct”). 
119 D.Y., 95 A.3d at 171. 
120 Id. at 172. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 161. 
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nal cases, it inquired as to whether SOMTA proceedings are criminal 
in nature.  If SOMTA proceedings were criminal in nature, then ap-
plying the same inquiry as in criminal cases would be justified.  
However, in Raul, the court was not able to find any relevant authori-
ty.  The courts in New York have held that SOMTA proceedings are 
civil in nature rather than criminal because New York’s civil com-
mitment statute is not punitive.  As a result, a respondent in a 
SOMTA proceeding does not enjoy the same due process rights that a 
defendant in a criminal proceeding does.  Therefore, the court in Raul 
noted that the Sixth Amendment protections do not apply to SOMTA 
proceedings.123 
The defendant in SOMTA proceedings does not enjoy the 
same due process rights as does a defendant in a criminal case be-
cause SOMTA proceedings are civil in nature.124  However, the court 
in Raul found that in family court proceedings, which are civil in na-
ture, the searching inquiry has been applied.125  Because of the due 
process implications in family court proceedings, the courts have ap-
plied the searching inquiry for the waiver of the right to counsel.126 
Finally, in Raul, the court considered that the due process im-
plications in SOMTA proceedings are similar to those in family court 
proceedings because of the rights that are at stake.127  Therefore, the 
court correctly applied the searching inquiry standard that is applied 
in criminal cases. 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
After evaluating the stances taken on the federal level and by 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey on whether the searching inquiry 
should be applied in a civil commitment proceeding, it can be con-
cluded that the court in Raul correctly applied the searching inquiry 
standard.  The due process implications for the respondents involved 
in SOMTA proceedings are the same, if not more significant, as for 
those involved in criminal proceedings.  However, if the court in 
Raul had required a standby counsel to be present at all times, that 
could have solved other challenges that might have arisen during the 
 




127 Id. at 199. 
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course of trial.128  Sometimes trial proceedings are disruptive because 
the respondent does not want to cooperate or wants to delay the pro-
ceedings, or it might be that the respondent is not competent to han-
dle his own case.  Having a standby counsel is an effective solution 
for all these challenges faced by the court during the course of trial. 
In many criminal cases where the court does provide the right 
to self-representation, the court appoints a standby counsel,129 even 
though they are not required to do so.130  In D.Y., the reason the court 
appointed standby counsel to be present during the entire proceeding 
was because the New Jersey statute required it.131  In contrast, New 
York’s civil commitment statute requires that counsel be appointed if 
the respondent is financially unable to obtain one.132  The courts in 
New York should follow New Jersey’s example and also require that 
standby counsel be present during the course of the civil commitment 
 
128 Because the topic of discussion of this Note is not whether the standby counsel should 
be present in civil commitment proceeding, this Note only provides a cursory view of the 
author’s opinion on why the court should have required standby counsel to be present during 
the civil commitment proceedings. 
129 See Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1207 (noting that “[d]efendant completed the trial pro se, 
with the former counsel serving as legal advisor”). 
130 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46 (finding that “a State may—even over objection by the 
accused—appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the accused requests 
help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defend-
ant's self-representation is necessary”) (emphasis added).  
131 Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01(b) (McKinney 2007) (stating the legislative 
finds as: “[t]hat some sex offenders have mental abnormalities that predispose them to en-
gage in repeated sex offenses.  These offenders may require long-term specialized treatment 
modalities to address their risk to reoffend. . . .  [C]onfinement of the most dangerous of-
fenders will need to be extended by civil process.”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-27.25(b) 
(West 2008).  The New Jersey statute states: 
Under the existing involuntary commitment procedure, persons are sub-
ject to commitment if they are mentally ill and dangerous to self, others 
or property.  “Mental illness” is a current, substantial disturbance of 
thought, mood, perception or orientation which significantly impairs 
judgment, capacity to control behavior or capacity to recognize reality, 
which causes the person to be dangerous to self, others or property.  The 
nature of the mental condition from which a sexually violent predator 
may suffer may not always lend itself to characterization under the exist-
ing statutory standard, although civil commitment may nonetheless be 
warranted due to the danger the person may pose to others as a result of 
the mental condition. 
Id. 
132 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06(c) (McKinney 2012) (stating that the court shall 
appoint an attorney for the respondent “where the respondent is financially unable to obtain 
counsel”). 
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proceeding because of the dangers involved.133 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The court in Raul correctly articulated the searching inquiry 
standard that the trial court should conduct before granting a re-
spondent’s request to proceed pro se.  In civil cases the defendant 
does not have a right to counsel through the Sixth Amendment, but 
some states have provided right to counsel because of the due process 
implications involved in certain type of civil cases.  Similarly, the 
searching inquiry should be conducted in civil commitment cases be-
cause of the due process implications involved.  One of the reasons 
for the courts to apply the same search inquiry standard as in criminal 
cases is that the stakes of deprivation of liberty are high, and the re-
spondents, by waiving their right, might end up being deprived of 
their life, liberty, or property. 
Further, even though New York’s civil commitment statute 
does not require the counsel to be present as New Jersey’s civil 
commitment statute does, the courts should require standby counsel 
to be present during the course of civil commitment proceedings 
when the respondent wants to proceed pro se.  A standby counsel can 
be an effective solution to challenges that might erupt during the 
course of trial that cannot be handled by the respondent. 
Arsalan Ali Memon* 
 
 
133 The New York legislature, at the time of enacting the civil commitment statute, did not 
take into consideration the importance of having standby counsel present during the proceed-
ings.  See generally Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act, N.Y. Bill Jacket, L. 
2007, ch. 7 (providing no discussion in regards to providing standby counsel during SOMTA 
proceedings).  See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.06 (providing no provision for standby 
counsel to be present during SOMTA proceedings). 
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